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This is a pre-published versionThis paper takes Gary Becker’s theory of marriage seriously. In his seminal paper,
Becker [1973] proposes an invisible hand theorem for the marriage market. He argues
that the competition for spouse leads men and women to be matched in such a way
that maximizes the sum total of marital output. Applications of the economic approach
to marriage are now commonplace. Becker et al. [1977] study the effect of imperfect
information on divorce. Benham [1974], Scully [1979] and Wong [1986] estimate the
effect of wife’s education on husband’s earnings. Grossbard-Shechtman [1993] and Rao
[1993] focus on the effect of sex ratio on (implicit or explicit) bride prices or dowries.
The literature, however, has virtually ignored Becker’s hypothesis that marriage markets
maximize total marital output, i.e., that marriage markets are efficient.
Mistakes are no doubt made in marriage decisions. The marriage market is not a
textbook example of perfect competition because of elaborate social norms, substantial
search costs, and room for bargaining and opportunistic behavior. Nevertheless, we
intend to push Becker’s efficient marriage market model at face value, and directly
confront it with data. The hypothesis that the marriage market maximizes marital
output provides a framework that allows estimating a model of spouse selection which
recovers some of the parameters of the production function for marital output. Using
the estimated parameters, we can use programming techniques to find the optimal male-
female pairing that maximizes the sum of marital output. The degree to which the actual
pairing of husbands and wives corresponds to the optimal pairing provides a goodness-
of-fit test of the efficient marriage market hypothesis. Our method is applied to census
data in Hong Kong.
A model of spouse selection (and other matching models) differs from a discrete
choice model (e.g., McFadden [1984]) in two important ways. First, the choice of a spouse
is mutual. Not only does each man choose a woman that yields him the highest net
utility, but each woman also picks a man that gives her the highest net utility. Second, in
a discrete choice model, several individuals can choose the same alternative. In marriage
markets, this is prohibited under monogamy. Thus new methods have to be developed
to analyze choice in marriage markets. Although marital output and the shadow price
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of husbands and wives are not observable, the theory of optimal matching allows us
to write down the likelihood function for the observed choice of marital partners. It
turns out that this model of spouse selection reduces to a version of the Tobit model
under the assumption that error terms are independently and identically normal. In
multinomial logit models the interpretation of parameters is cumbersome, especially
when the number of alternatives is large. In our model of spouse selection, the estimated
parameters are directly related to the production function of marital output. The signs of
these parameters can be used to address the issue of positive versus negative assortative
mating. The model can also be used to test marginal product pricing in the marriage
market.
With the estimated production function from the model of spouse selection, we can
impute the marital output for all possible male-female pairs. Using these imputed output
figures, the optimal pairing between men and women that maximizes the sum of marital
output can be found using an algorithm that solves the assignment problem. The degree
to which this optimal pairing corresponds to the observed pairing then provides a natural
way of assessing marriage market efficiency. Given the limited range of information
contained in the census, we find that our model of spouse selection fits the observed
choices better than other models (such as one based on ranking method). Following
Varian’s [1990] proposal for goodness-of-fit tests for optimizing models, we derive a
measure of efficiency which is based on the distance between total imputed marital
output under observed matching and that under optimal matching. This efficiency
index is calculated to be about 80 percent, which is 27 standard deviations greater than
the mean efficiency index under random assignment.
Previous empirical work on the choice of marriage partners are mostly descriptive in
nature. The issue of positive versus negative assortative mating has attracted attention
from demographers, psychologists, sociologists, and economists alike (e.g., Winch [1958];
Epstein and Guttman [1984]; Mare [1991]). Most of these studies rely on cross tabula-
tions (when the personal traits are qualitative) or on simple correlations (when the traits
are quantitative). Our approach can deal with qualitative and quantitative traits, as well
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as same-trait interactions and cross-trait interactions, under a unified framework. More
importantly, tools such as tabulations and correlations are ad hoc and are inadequate
for hypothesis testing. By focusing on the correlation of traits between married couples,
these methods ignore the matrix of potential couples in a marriage market. The fact
that two people can—but choose not to—marry each other contains information about
the underlying production function of marital output. Our model makes use of the full
information contained in the data as specified by the theory of efficient matching. In-
terpretation of parameters is straightforward and hypothesis testing is well integrated
with the underlying theory.
The theory behind this paper is not new. We consider the matching of husbands
and wives as an optimal assignment problem (see Koopmans and Beckmann [1957] and
Becker [1973]). In taking this track, we implicitly assume price taking behavior and
ignore the bargaining issues associated with matching. Alvin Roth and others (e.g.,
Roth and Sotomayor [1990]; Shapley and Shubik [1972]; Gale and Shapley [1962]) have
studied extensively the game theoretic aspect of matching problems with and without
transferable utility. Manser and Brown [1980], McElroy and Horney [1981] and Lund-
berg and Pollak [1993] discuss intrafamily allocation problems from a Nash bargaining
perspective. Cohen [1987] and Allen [1992] analyze the problems that arise when trans-
action costs within marriage are significant. The extent to which such problems affect
the conclusions of the competitive model, however, is an empirical issue. This paper in-
tends to determine how well a pure competitive model corresponds to observed marital
patterns.
Research on marriage using the optimal assignment approach is sparse. Bergstrom
and Lam [1994] were the first to apply linear programming methods to the empirical
study of marriage. Their paper focuses on matching by age and its relationship to
the “marriage squeeze.” The full implications of an efficient marriage market are not
explored. Foster and Khan [1994] and Foster [1996] develop an empirical model of
marriage market equilibrium that relies on the notion that couples in a marriage market
do not want to exchange partners. Their papers are similar in spirit to ours, but they
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do not address issues relating to pricing and efficiency in the marriage market.
I. AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF SPOUSE SELECTION
In this section we briefly review the theory of efficient marriage markets, with an
eye on empirical implementation. The theory is a direct application of the optimal
assignment problem in operations research, which is in turn a special case of linear pro-
gramming. More detailed discussions can be found in Koopmans and Beckmann [1957],
Shapley and Shubik [1972], Becker [1973], and in most texts on linear programming.
The main innovation in this paper is in the econometric implementation of the theory,
rather than in the theory as such.
We focus on the selection of spouse rather than the decision to get married. Suppose
there are n women and n men in the marriage market. The ith woman is characterized
by a vector of characteristics Fi = (Fi1, . . . , FiK), and the ith man has characteristics
Mi = (Mi1, . . . , MiK). If woman i and man j get married, their marital output will be
given by the production function:
Zij = Z(Fi, Mj , uij).
Here uij refers to the effect of random disturbances that are unobservable by the econo-
metrician but are known to the participants in the marriage market (e.g., “personal
chemistry”). We assume the uij ’s are independent for all i and j.
1 Marital output Zij
need not be material output, and it is unobservable.
To be more specific, let the production function take the form:
Zij = α +
∑
k
β0kFik +
∑
k
γ0kMjk +
∑
k
δkFikMjk + uij .
This production function exhibits complementarities if the δ coefficients are positive.
When this is the case, people with similar characteristics will be matched together in
an efficient market (see also Sattinger [1975] and Kremer [1993]). For example, let
characteristic k refer to years of schooling, and let δk be positive, normalized to one.
Suppose there are two men in the market, one with 16 years of schooling and the other
with 12 years. Similarly, let the two women in the market have 16 and 12 years of
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schooling respectively. If men and women with similar education marry each other (i.e.,
positive assortative matching), total marital output will be 256 + 144 = 400. If the
college educated woman marries the high school man (negative assortative matching),
total marital output will be 192 + 192 = 384. An efficient marriage market will then
match men and women with similar characteristics. Conversely, if ∂2Zij/∂Fik∂Mjk = δk
is negative, corresponding male and female traits are substitutes in the production of
marital output. One would then expect to see negative assortative matching.
An efficient marriage market is one which maximizes the sum of marital output sub-
ject to the constraint that each woman marries only one man and each man marries only
one woman.2 Without loss of generality, we arrange the women and men in the sample
in such a way that the ith woman and the ith man are married couples. A necessary
and sufficient condition for efficiency is that there exist vectors P m = (Pm1 , . . . , P
m
n ) and
P f = (P f1 , . . . , P
f
n ) such that
P fi + P
m
i = Zii, i = 1, . . . , n;
P fi + P
m
j ≥ Zij , i 6= j.
The P f and Pm vectors are the shadow values for women and men in the competitive
marriage market.3 The equality restrictions state that the sum of shadow values for
a couple is equal to their marital output. The inequalities imply that no “blocking
coalition” exists in the marriage market equilibrium. If the inequality restriction is not
satisfied for some pair of man and woman who are not a couple, they can be made better
off by marrying to each other and dividing the marital output in such a way that both
get more income than their existing shadow values.
We assume the distribution of personal traits is continuous and sufficiently dense so
that the shadow prices are uniquely determined.4 Given that woman i commands a price
of P fi , the net marital output for man i who wants to marry her will be Zii−P
f
i = P
m
i .
If man i marries another woman, say j, his net marital output will be Zji − P
f
j < P
m
i .
Thus, given the efficiency conditions shown above, man i will maximize his net income
by choosing woman i as his spouse. Similarly the ith woman will maximize her net
marital output by marrying the ith man. The competitive marriage market with its set
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of shadow prices works like an invisible hand that ties men and women together in such
a way that maximizes total marital output.
The shadow prices are unobservable to the econometrician. One way of estimating
them is to treat them as individual fixed effects. This will be attempted in Section IV.
However, estimating a large number of fixed effect parameters is not always practical.
One way of simplifying the model is to treat the shadow prices as hedonic functions of
individual characteristics. Specifically, we let
P fi = α
f +
∑
k
β1kFik +
∑
k
β2kF
2
ik;
Pmi = α
m +
∑
k
γ1kMik +
∑
k
γ2kM
2
ik.
The quadratic terms are designed to capture the non-linear effects arising from assor-
tative matching (e.g., Rosen [1982]; Kremer [1993]). For example, if there is positive
assortative matching in education, shadow prices will be convex in years of schooling.
Notice that the shadow price of a person in the marriage market only depends on
his or her personal characteristics, but not on the identity of his or her spouse.5 As
in Rosen’s [1974] model of competitive market for differentiated products, the price of
a product depends on its attributes but not on the identity of the buyer.6 Bargaining
and small numbers problems are assumed away. Also note that we have not included
a random term in the hedonic price functions. Doing so will introduce complicated
interdependence into the model so that the resulting log-likelihood function will not be
manageable. This is remedied in Section IV, where we estimate fixed effects models for
random sub-samples of smaller size.
Given our specification of the production function and of the price functions, the
conditions for market efficiency can be rewritten as:
−(a + b1Fi + b2F
2
i + c1Mi + c2M
2
i + dFM ii) = uii, i = 1, . . . , n;
−(a + b1Fi + b2F
2
i + c1Mj + c2M
2
j + dFM ij) > uij , i 6= j.
In the above expression, a = α−αf−αm, b1 = β0−β1, b2 = −β2,c1 = γ0−γ1, c2 = −γ2,
and d = δ. F 2i and M
2
i are the vectors of the squares of female and male attributes.
FM ij refers to the vector of interaction terms. The products are understood to be inner
products.
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We assume the uij ’s are independently distributed with density function φ(·) and
distribution function Φ(·). Thus the log-likelihood function for the sample observations
is: ∑
i
log φ(−(a + b1Fi + b2F
2
i + c1Mi + c2M
2
i + dFM ii))
+
∑
i6=j
log Φ(−(a + b1Fi + b2F
2
i + c1Mj + c2M
2
j + dFM ij)).
If u is normally distributed, this log-likelihood function is equivalent to that of a Tobit
model. Let the dependent variable be yij = max{0, a + b1Fi + b2F
2
i + c1Mj + c2M
2
j +
dFM ij + uij}. If yij is censored for i 6= j and is uncensored for i = j, and if yij is
identically zero, the resulting log-likelihood function is identical to our model of spouse
selection. Thus our model can be estimated by simply running a Tobit regression with
zero as the dependent variable and with Fi, Mj , F
2
i , M
2
j and FM ij as independent vari-
ables.
There are two differences from the conventional Tobit model, however. First, since
the uncensored variables are identically zero, the variance of the error distribution can-
not be identified. In other words, all the estimated parameters are unique up to a
multiplicative constant. In what follows, we normalize the variance to one. Second, in
a sample of n couples, the log-likelihood function consists of the sum of n2 terms. It is
as if one were to estimate the Tobit model on n2 observations.
It can also be observed that the production function parameter β0 and the hedonic
price function parameter β1 cannot be separately identified. Similarly only the difference
c1 = γ0− γ1 is identifiable. The production parameter (δ = d), and the quadratic terms
in the price function (β2 = −b2, γ2 = −c2), on the other hand, are identifiable (up to a
multiplicative constant). Thus estimators of d can be used to test hypotheses concerning
positive or negative assortative matching. Estimators of b2 and c2 can be used to assess
the concavity or convexity of the hedonic price functions.
We can further use the model to test marginal productivity theory in the marriage
market. In our model, the shadow price of attribute k for the jth man is γ1k +2γ2kMjk.
The marginal product of this attribute for this man is γ0k + δkFjk. The theory of
marginal productivity suggests that the price of an attribute is equal to its marginal
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product. Unless matching is perfect, however, this restriction is unlikely to be true for
each and every couple in the sample. We test a weaker version of marginal product
pricing by summing the equality restriction over all couples. Denote the sample mean
values of Fjk and Mjk by F.k and M.k, respectively. Then, in terms of the parameters
that can be estimated, the implied restriction on the model coefficients can be written
as
c1k + 2c2kM.k + dkF.k = 0,
for all attributes k. This restriction will be tested both for men and for women.7
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA
The empirical model of spouse selection developed in this paper is estimated using
census data from Hong Kong. We choose to work on Hong Kong data mainly because
of convenience and familiarity. As in any industry study, determining the appropriate
extent of the market is fraught with difficulties. We simply assume the entire territory
of Hong Kong constitutes the relevant marriage market.8
Data for this study are drawn from the ten percent random sample of the Hong Kong
1976 population by-census. More recent censuses do not contain information about the
year of marriage and are less suitable for our purposes. We identify all couples who were
married a year before the census and who were living in the same household at the time
of the census. People who were not born in Hong Kong or China are excluded. This
gives a sample of 2110 couples.
We focus on people who were married in 1975 for two reasons. First, our model
assumes anyone in the marriage market can marry anyone else if he or she so chooses.
If the data contain, say, a man married in 1970 and a woman married in 1975, the man
would have to first obtain a divorce before he could legally marry that woman. One
could argue that, ex ante, the man has the option to delay marriage; that is, before
1970, the man and the woman were in the same marriage market (unless the woman
was a minor at that time). However, this kind of argument will bring the timing of
marriage into the model and complicate the analysis.9 We choose instead to consider
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the marriage market as consisting of men and women who were married within some
relatively short period of time (one year). The second reason for excluding people who
were married more than one year before the census is that we have information on wages
at the time of the census but not at the time of marriage. Wages in 1976 are a better
indicator for wages in 1975 than they are for wages in, say, 1970. Focusing on the newly
married therefore has the advantage that the wage data will more accurately reflect the
information available at the time marriage decisions were made.
To examine the issue of assortative matching in wage, we further select only those
records with wage information for both husband and wife. The resulting group of 772
couples will form the main data set of our empirical work. The main difference between
this sample and the full sample of 2110 couples is that women with wage information on
average received one more year of education than women in the full sample. The labor
force participation rate for newly married women (.44) is between that for all married
women aged 16–30 (.35) and for single women in the same age group (.69).
Many personal characteristics that are relevant for marriage decisions are not avail-
able from the census. This study concentrates on four observable characteristics: age
at marriage, years of schooling, place of birth, and market wage rate. The variables
age and school measure the first two characteristics. The variable china is a dummy
variable indicating whether the person was born in China (china = 1) or born in Hong
Kong (china = 0).
The construction of the wage variable requires some explanation. There are system-
atic differences in wage rates during the life cycle. For example, on average, a 25 year
old man is expected to earn less than a 35 year old. This does not necessarily make
the 25 year old man a less desirable spouse because it is the present value of lifetime
earnings that counts in marriage decisions. For this reason, the variable wage is obtained
by standardizing the observed log wage at the mean age of marriage. For males, we run
an OLS regression of log wage on schooling, place of birth and a fourth order polyno-
mial on age. If the vector of age variables is denoted A and the vector of corresponding
estimated coefficients in the wage regression is denoted ηˆ, the wage variable is defined
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as
log(observed wage)− ηˆA + ηˆA¯,
where A¯ is the vector of age variables evaluated at the sample mean. The definition of
the wage variable for women follows that for men, except that ηˆ is computed from a
selection-bias corrected regression instead of by ordinary least squares.10
Table I shows some descriptive statistics of the various variables. Numbers in the
bottom row refer to the means and standard deviations of male characteristics, and num-
bers in the marginal column refer to female characteristics. For example, the husbands
in this sample were on average 3.3 years older than the wives, and had .7 more year
of education. The main elements in the cross table are correlation coefficients between
male and female characteristics. For example, the simple correlation between husbands’
age and wives’ age is .578. All the diagonal entries are positive, indicating that there is
positive assortative matching on each attribute.
Notice, however, that correlation coefficients are reduced-form statistics. For exam-
ple, suppose f school and m school are complementary in the production of marital
output, while f wage and m wage are substitutes. If more educated people tend to
earn more, and if the complementarity between education is much stronger than the
substitutability between wage, we will observe that more educated (higher wage) men
are married to more educated (higher wage) women. The observed correlation between
f wage and m wage would then be positive even though these two attributes are sub-
stitutes. The table of correlation coefficients in Table I, therefore, does not reveal the
underlying substitutability and complementarity relationships in the production func-
tion for marital output.
III. TESTING ASSORTATIVE MATCHING
AND MARGINAL PRODUCT PRICING
Our model of spouse selection is estimated with (Model W) and without (Model
NW) the wage variable. The parameter estimates are displayed in the first two columns
of Table II. The coefficients on female traits and on male traits represent linear combi-
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nations of production function and price function parameters. Theory does not place
any restrictions on their sign or statistical significance. The main parameters of interest
are those associated with the interaction terms. In each specification, the coefficients for
the same-trait interaction terms are positive and highly significant. This indicates that
corresponding male and female traits are complements in the production function for
marital output. Such results are consistent with positive assortative matching in age,
schooling, place of birth, and wage.
Comparing Model W to Model NW, the model that includes wage variables gives
a significantly higher log-likelihood ratio. Earnings power seems to be an important
consideration in marriage decisions. Although Becker [1973] predicts negative assortative
matching in wage as a result of the household division of labor, our findings do not
support his hypothesis. Lam [1988] offers a theoretical reason why Becker’s prediction
may fail in the presence of household public goods. Our empirical results are also
consistent with Watkins and Meredith [1981], who report a positive correlation between
husband’s and wife’s income.11
The coefficients on the squared terms in Table II are all negative and statistically
significant. This means the shadow prices are convex functions of the personal attributes
(since b2 = −β2 and c2 = −γ2). The convexity of the price functions is consistent with
complementarities in the production function of marital output.
Cross-Trait Interactions
The specification of the marital output production function need not be confined to
same-trait interactions. There may exist complementarity relations between husband’s
education and wife’s age, or between wife’s education and husband’s age. Such cross-trait
interactions need not be symmetric either. In fact the set of female characteristics used
in the estimation does not have to be the same as the set of male characteristics. In other
applications of the assignment model, such as the matching of houses to homeowners,
positive or negative assortative matching is not an issue because the characteristics of
a house cannot be directly compared to the characteristics of a homeowner. Yet the
matching model developed here is still applicable. If there are K1 relevant attributes on
11
one side and K2 relevant attributes on the other side, a full model will involve K1K2
parameters to be estimated for the interaction effects.
The last two columns of Table II shows the estimated coefficients of the full interac-
tions model with and without wage variables. For Model NW-C, 4 out of 6 coefficients
for the cross-trait interaction terms are statistically insignificant (at the .01 level). The
likelihood ratio test fails to reject the hypothesis that the cross-interaction effects are
jointly zero. Although the hypothesis that the cross effects are jointly zero is rejected
for Model W-C, 9 out of 12 coefficients for the cross-trait terms are not significant indi-
vidually. Introducing cross-interaction effects does not substantially improve the fit of
the model.12 Moreover, the coefficient estimates for same-trait interaction terms do not
change much across specifications; it is only the coefficients that are imprecisely esti-
mated that change quite a bit. We therefore prefer to work with the simpler same-trait
interactions model. In the remainder of the paper, the empirical work will focus only on
Models W and NW.
Robustness
Our sample of 772 couples does not include those for which wage information for
either husband or wife is not available. To make sure that our results are robust to
sample selection rule, we have re-estimated Model NW using the records of all 2110
newly married couples. The estimated coefficients are not materially different from
those obtained from the smaller sample. For example, the coefficients (standard errors)
associated with the same-trait interaction terms for age, china, and school are 0.010
(0.001), 0.288 (0.030), and 0.020 (0.001), respectively. These estimates are fairly close
to those reported in in first column of Table II.
The wage variable used in this study has been adjusted for life-cycle differences in
wage. We have also estimated Model W where the observed log wage is used instead
of the standardized wage. It turns out that using the raw wage instead of the adjusted
wage does not change any qualitative results. In particular, our conclusion about positive
assortative matching in wage still holds.
Finally we have checked the robustness of the model against alternative functional
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forms for the error distribution. If the error terms are not normal, the model of spouse
selection can no longer be estimated by a Tobit regression. Nevertheless the likelihood
function can still be regarded as one arising from a survival type model (e.g., Cox and
Oakes [1984]) involving censored and uncensored observations. We have estimated the
model using the extreme value distribution, the logistic distribution and the gamma
distribution. Again, the results regarding positive assortative matching continue to
hold. Our model of spouse selection is not very sensitive to the assumed distribution of
the error term.13
Marginal Product Pricing
The theory of marginal product pricing requires that the marginal product of a
personal attribute to be equal to its marginal value in the marriage market. In terms of
the parameters of the model, the theory applied to women requires that b1k + 2b2kF.k +
dkM.k = 0, and the theory applied to men requires c1k + 2c2kM.k + dkF.k = 0. We
impose these restrictions separately and jointly to our model of spouse selection. Table
III shows the results.
The coefficient estimates shown in Table III do not differ much from those in Table
II. Formal statistical tests do not reject the equality restrictions imposed by the theory
of marginal productivity. Under the null hypothesis, two times the difference in the
value of the log-likelihood function is distributed as a chi-squared random variable with
degrees of freedom equal to the number of equality restrictions imposed. For example,
the χ2-statistic for models W-M&F is 2.15 with 8 degrees of freedom. The critical χ2-
statistic at the .01 significance level is 20.09. As shown in the bottom row of Table III,
the χ2-statistics are all smaller than the corresponding critical values at conventional
levels of statistical significance. The hypothesis that personal traits are correctly priced
in the marriage market is not rejected.
IV. FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
One problem with the empirical model of spouse selection estimated in the previous
section is that it ignores unobserved individual fixed effects. This problem is particularly
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important when census data is used, because the census only contains very limited
information relevant to marriage decisions. Individual characteristics such as personality,
wealth, family background and “looks” are probably more important determinants of
marital choice than the basic demographic variables (age, schooling, place of birth, wage)
used in our estimation. Such characteristics are unobservable to the econometrician but
are observable to participants in the marriage market, and they affect marital output as
well as shadow prices. In this section we attempt to control for unobserved heterogeneity
using a fixed effects model.
We let marital output be a function of observable characteristics as well as individual
fixed effects:
Zij = µ
fz
i + µ
mz
j + βFi + γMj + δFM ij + uij .
Shadow prices (P f1 , . . . , P
f
n ) and (P
m
1 , . . . , P
m
n ) are simply specified as fixed constants.
The condition for marriage market efficiency becomes:
−(µfi + µ
m
i + βFi + γMi + δFM ii) = uii, i = 1, . . . , n;
−(µfi + µ
m
j + βFi + γMj + δFM ij) > uij , i 6= j;
where µfi = µ
fz
i − P
f
i and µ
m
j = µ
mz
j − P
m
j . With these fixed effects, the parameters β
and γ will not be identified and the log likelihood function can be reduced to:
∑
i
log φ(−(µfi + µ
m
i + δFM ii)) +
∑
i6=j
log Φ(−(µfi + µ
m
j + δFM ij)).
This log likelihood function can again be maximized using a Tobit regression.
With a sample of 772 couples, estimating a fixed effects model would require esti-
mating more than 1500 parameters. To deal with the computational problem, we resort
to a bootstrap procedure (see, for example, Efron and Tibshirani [1993]). We randomly
draw (without replacement) a sub-sample of 100 couples from the original sample.14
A Tobit model is estimated for this sub-sample, which involves 200 rather than 1544
fixed effects. The coefficient estimates of δ are saved. This procedure is repeated one
thousand times. The means of the saved values of δ will give the point estimates of δ
and the standard deviations of these saved values will give the standard errors.
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The second and fifth columns in Table IV shows the bootstrap estimates of the
parameters in the fixed effects model with (Model W-FE) and without (Model NW-FE)
the wage variable. The coefficients for the same-trait interaction terms are all positive
and significant, indicating that age, schooling, place of birth, and wage of husband and
wife are complementary inputs to the production of marital output. The introduction
of individual fixed effects therefore does not change our conclusions about assortative
matching.
Our original hedonic pricing model estimated in Section III (i.e., without fixed ef-
fects) can be regarded as a special case of the fixed effects model where the individual
fixed effects are constrained to be of the form:
µfi = a
f +
∑
k
b1kFik +
∑
k
b2kF
2
il;
µmj = a
m +
∑
k
c1kMjk +
∑
k
c2kM
2
jk;
where af + am = a. We estimate the hedonic pricing model on the same 1000 random
sub-samples and the results are displayed in the first and fourth column of Table IV.
Comparing Model NW to Model NW-FE, the largest χ2-statistic in these 1000 sub-
samples is 9.54. The critical χ2-statistic (189 degrees of freedom) at the .01 level is
237.15. In other words, in none of the 1000 random sub-samples does the fixed effects
model give a significantly better fit to the data than the hedonic price model. Similarly,
comparing Model W to Model W-FE, two times the difference in log-likelihood never
exceeds 17; while the corresponding critical χ2 value is 233 (185 degrees of freedom).
This indicates our original hedonic pricing model is a good and parsimonious way of
representing the marriage market; introducing fixed effects into the model does not
substantially improve the fit.
We also use the bootstrap method to estimate the model with restrictions imposed
by marginal productivity theory. The results are shown in columns 3 and 6 of Table
IV. In all the 1000 bootstrap runs, marginal product pricing is not rejected. This agrees
with our earlier conclusion reached using the full sample of 772 couples.
V. PREDICTING MARRIAGE PARTNERS
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Is the efficient marriage market model useful in predicting actual marriage patterns?
We approach this question by using the estimated spouse selection model to compute
the optimal pairing of men and women that maximizes the sum of imputed marital
output. Such optimal pairing is then compared to the observed pairing. We find that
the efficient market model correctly predicts more married couples than either random
pairing or pairing based on ranking.
In our model of spouse selection, the estimated coefficients cannot be used to give
an imputed marital output, Zˆij , because some of the production function parameters
are not identified. Fortunately the theory of optimal assignment (see Koopmans and
Beckmann [1957]) establishes that any assignment that maximizes
∑
Zˆij also maximizes
∑
(Zˆij + λ
f
i + λ
m
j ), for any fixed vectors (λ
f
1 , . . . , λ
f
n) and (λ
m
1 , . . . , λ
m
n ). Since the index
variable, Iij , from the Tobit regressions (with or without fixed effects) only differs from
Zˆij by two fixed vectors, we can solve the optimal assignment problem by maximizing
∑
Iij instead of
∑
Zˆij .
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The actual solution of an optimal assignment problem is non-trivial, but there are
efficient computer algorithms that can be used. We rely on the Fortran subroutine in
Burkard and Derigs [1980]. We save the predicted index variable Iij from the Tobit
regressions and use Burkard and Derigs’s program to find the optimal pairing between
men and women that maximizes
∑
Iij . Of the n optimal pairs computed by the program,
if k pairs are actual married couples, the model is said to make k correct predictions.
One way to assess a model which gives k correct matches out of n pairs is to find the
probability that such an event will occur by pure chance. Let p(n, k) be the probability of
having k married couples when n husbands and wives are randomly re-matched.16 When
n is moderately large (greater than 20, say), the distribution of k is well approximated
by a Poisson distribution with parameter 1. That is,
p(n, k) ≈ e−1/k!.
Two features about the distribution of k are worth mentioning. First, for large n, the
approximate distribution of k is independent of n. For example, the probability of
predicting one married couple from one hundred randomly re-shuffled couples is approx-
16
imately the same as the probability of predicting one married couple from one thousand
randomly re-shuffled couples. Second, the mean and variance of k are both equal to 1.
On average, therefore, randomly matching n pairs will give 1 correct prediction regard-
less of n.
The first column in Table 5 gives the exact distribution of k for n = 100. Note that if
the matching of men and women is random, the probability of finding no correct match
is non-trivial (.368), while the probability of finding 10 or more matches is almost nil.
In the remaining four columns of Table V, we display the empirical distributions of the
number of correct predictions using the efficient market model. For each Tobit regression
that we run on the 1000 sub-samples discussed in Section 4, we record the number of
correct predictions generated by Burkard and Derigs’s optimal assignment program.
For example, the model using the variables age, school and china without fixed effects
yields on average 5.34 correct predictions. Under random matching the probability of
giving 5 or more correct predictions is less than 1 percent, while the model gives more
than 5 correct matches in 605 out of 1000 trials. The fixed effects model produces
similar results as the model without fixed effects. When the variable wage is added to
the spouse selection model, the average number of correct predictions increases to 6.70
(without fixed effects) and to 6.75 (with fixed effects), respectively. The spouse selection
model clearly gives more correct predictions than what pure chance would suggest.
While predicting 6 married couples out of 100 may seem trivial, it is not clear what
the appropriate metric is for assessing whether a certain number of correct predictions is
“large” or “small.” With 100 men and 100 women, there are 100! ≈ 9.3× 10157 possible
permutations. Table V shows that the chance of making 6 or more correct predictions
is less than one in a thousand. Predicting 6 correct matches on average is not so easy
as it may first seem.
Another way of assessing the spouse selection model is to compare the number of
correct predictions with that generated by an alternative model. In the literature on
assortative matching (e.g., Epstein and Guttmann 1984), positive or negative sorting is
indicated by the sign of the correlation coefficient between the traits of husbands and
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wives. Thus one method to predict marriage partners is to match men and women
by their rank in the distribution of traits. For example, if there is positive assortative
matching in wage, we can match the woman with the rth highest female wage to the
man with the rth highest wage among men.
To implement the ranking method to the case involving more than one trait, we rely
on canonical correlation analysis.17 Suppose men and women are arranged in such a way
that the ith man is married to the ith woman. Let Fi1, . . . , FiK be relevant traits of
the wife, and let Mi1, . . . , MiK be the husband’s characteristics. Instead of examining
the simple correlation coefficient between each trait separately, canonical correlation
analysis examines the correlation between the K traits combined. More specifically, the
analysis finds two vectors of weights, (θf1 , . . . , θ
f
K) and (θ
m
1 , . . . , θ
m
K), such that the linear
combinations xi =
∑
k θ
f
kFik and yi =
∑
k θ
m
k Mik have the maximal correlation.
In our 1000 random sub-samples, the canonical correlation between husbands and
wives averages to .713 for the model using age, school and china. The average canonical
correlation increases to .758 when wage is included. For each sub-sample, we also save
the canonical latent variables x and y. The woman with the rth highest x value is
matched to the man with the rth highest y. The number of correct married couples
predicted by this ranking method is recorded.
Figure 1 compares the distributions of the number of correct matches generated
by the spouse selection model to that generated by the ranking method using the four
variables age, school, china and wage. The ranking method produces an average of
3.2 correct predictions. On the other hand, the efficient market models give an aver-
age of 6.7 correct matches. In 856 of the 1000 bootstrap samples, the spouse selection
model (Model W) gives more correct matches than the ranking method, while the rank-
ing method gives more correct matches in only 83 of the 1000 samples. The frequency
distributions in Figure 1 clearly show that the efficient market model first-order stochas-
tically dominates the ranking method. Comparison of the ranking method to the spouse
selection model without the wage variable yields essentially the same results.
VI. HOW EFFICIENT IS THE MARRIAGE MARKET?
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In optimizing models, Varian [1990] argues that the economically relevant measure of
goodness-of-fit is the distance between the predicted and the observed value of the ob-
jective function. Even if the observed pairing of men and women bears little resemblance
to the pattern predicted by the efficient matching model, it is possible that the resulting
loss in total marital output is economically insignificant. In our model, let Zo =
∑
Zˆii
denote the imputed total marital output. If the optimal assignment matches man pi∗(i)
to woman i, let Z∗ =
∑
Zˆi,pi∗(i) denote the maximum marital output. Then a natural
measure of the degree of marriage market efficiency is Zo/Z∗.
Assuming the estimated coefficients in our spouse selection model are the true pro-
duction function parameters, information on total marital output can be partially recov-
ered even though marital output is not directly observable. Since some of the produc-
tion function parameters are unidentified, however, the index variable from our Tobit
regressions, Iij , will differ from imputed marital output, Zˆij , by two fixed but unknown
vectors, (λf1 , . . . , λ
f
n) and (λ
m
1 , . . . , λ
m
n ). Thus, for any assignment pi that assigns man
pi(i) to woman i, the sum of the index variables will differ from the sum of marital output
by an additive constant:
∑
Ii,pi(i) = Λ +
∑
Zˆi,pi(i), where Λ =
∑
i(λ
f
i + λ
m
i ). Because Λ
is unknown, Zo/Z∗ cannot be recovered from
∑
Iii and
∑
Ii,pi∗(i). We therefore use an
alternative measure of marriage market efficiency:
E = (Zo − Z∗)/(Z
∗ − Z∗),
where Z∗ is the value of the objective function given by the assignment pi∗ that minimizes
the sum of imputed marital output.18
Denote Io =
∑
Iii, I
∗ =
∑
Ii,pi∗(i), and I∗ =
∑
Ii,pi∗(i), then (I
o − I∗)/(I
∗ − I∗) =
(Zo − Z∗)/(Z
∗ − Z∗) regardless of the magnitude of the additive constant Λ. Therefore
the efficiency measure E can be computed even though the marital output production
function is not fully identified. This measure of efficiency ranges between zero and one:
If the marriage market minimizes marital output, the efficiency measure is equal to zero;
if it maximizes output, the efficiency measure is one.
Using the sample of 772 couples, and using the spouse selection model based on
the variables age, school, china and wage, (i.e., Model W in Table 2), we find that
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E = .801. Thus, compared to a full information and perfectly competitive market, the
inefficiency loss in the Hong Kong marriage market is about twenty percent.19
One way to assess whether the calculated efficiency measure is “large” or “small” is
to compare it to the efficiency measures generated from other possible assignments. With
772 couples, there are a total of 772! ≈ 6.4× 101895 possible assignments. Clearly it is
impossible to exhaust all possibilities. We instead draw one million random assignments
and compute the value of E for each case. Under Model W, the one million values
of E have a mean of .476 and a standard deviation of .012. The maximum value of
the efficiency index from these one million random assignments is .533 (4.7 standard
deviations away from the mean). In contrast, the actual efficiency measure of is .801,
which is 26.7 standard deviations greater than the mean. In other words, none of the one
million random assignments produces a total marital output above that in the marriage
market.20 Such an event will occur with a probability of less than 3.7 × 10−44 if Zo is
not in the top 1/10000 quantile of the distribution of
∑
Zˆi,pi(i). This exercise lead us to
conclude that the marriage market is not grossly inefficient.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
With information only on the basic demographic characteristics available from the
census, we do not expect the spouse selection model to explain every detail of the
marriage market. On the whole, however, the empirical model derived from the efficient
marriage market hypothesis fits the data well. We find that corresponding male and
female attributes (age, schooling, place of birth, and wage) are complementary in the
production function for marital output. The hedonic pricing function is found to be
a good representation of shadow prices in the marriage market, and marginal product
pricing is not rejected. The empirical model also suggests that the marriage market is
relatively efficient: total marital output is greater than that under generated by most
other assignments.
One obvious way to improve on the model is to utilize data sets that contain richer
information on personal characteristics. For example, if panel data is used, pre-marriage
20
wage and occupation can safely be assumed to be independent of marital decisions. Such
information can be exploited to help settle the question of whether there is positive or
negative assortative matching in wage.
Conventional large scale surveys, however, are not expected to contain many of the
variables pertinent to marriage decisions. More fruitful use of our model probably de-
pend on new applications and more novel data sets. For example, the matching of CEOs
to corporations can be regarded as an optimal assignment problem and estimated using
the model developed here. With information on corporate characteristics and the per-
sonal characteristics of the CEOs, the model will help determine the complementarity
relationships between such characteristics. Another example is the matching of houses
to homeowners. Data on the characteristics of houses and of homeowners are readily
available. By deriving an empirically matching model that is fully consistent with max-
imizing behavior, we hope this paper will stimulate the empirical research on such and
other matching problems.
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1 The problem of unobserved individual heterogeneity will be addressed in a fixed
effects model in Section IV.
2 We ignore polygamy and polyandry.
3 The optimal matching of women and men can be described as a linear program
that maximizes
∑
ij xijZij subject to
∑
i xij = 1,
∑
j xij = 1, and xij ≥ 0. The P
f
and Pm vectors are the Lagrange multipliers of the equality constraints. As usual these
Lagrange multipliers can be interpreted as shadow values.
4 See, for example, Roth and Sotomayer [1990], Bennett [1988] and McLaughlin
[1994] for discussions of matching models involving thin markets.
5 The shadow value of a certain male attribute will depend on the distribution
of the corresponding female attribute in the market. For example, if male and female
education are complementary, the shadow value of male education will be relatively high
in a market where women are well educated, and the shadow value will be relatively low
in a market where women are less well educated. There is an extensive literature on how
the age distribution of the population produces a “marriage squeeze” (e.g., Grossbard-
Shechtman [1993]; Rao [1993]). In a large market, however, each individual woman will
have negligible effect on the shadow value of male characteristics.
6 The shadow price of a woman is her net utility from marriage. If a woman marries
an otherwise undesirable man, she will be compensated by a higher material output
(see Grossbard-Shechtman [1993]), but her net utility—i.e., her shadow price—remains
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unchanged.
7 If the production function and pricing function parameters were known rather than
estimated, we can also test marginal productivity theory by performing a paired t-test
between γ1k + 2γ2kMjk and γ0k + δkFjk.
8 Assuming the entire territory constitutes one market is less unrealistic for a city
such as Hong Kong than for larger countries. Researchers interested in marriage markets
elsewhere are advised to analyze the data at the city or county level rather than at the
national level.
9 See, for example, Keeley [1977] for a discussion on the optimal timing of marriage.
10 We use Heckman’s [1979] two-stage estimation procedures to correct for this self se-
lectivity. In the first stage probit regression, we use household size, schooling (quadratic),
place of birth and age (third order polynomial) as independent variables. The inverse
Mills ratio computed from the probit estimates together with the above independent
variables except household size are entered into the second stage wage regression. The
estimated coefficient on the self-selectivity term is negative but statistically insignificant.
11 The wage observations we have are post-marriage wages. Since the division of
labor within the family may affect the choice of occupations and labor effort (see Becker
[1985; 1991]), observed wages may be correlated with marital choice. Using pre-marriage
wages would be superior to post-marriage wages if such data are available.
12 Including wage variables into Model NW uses 5 degrees of freedom and increases
the log-likelihood by 51.3. Including cross-interaction terms into Model W uses 12
degrees of freedom and increases the log-likelihood by 17.2.
13 Detailed tables showing the coefficient estimates under the alternative specifica-
tions discussed in this sub-section are available from the authors.
14 If sampling were done with replacement, a couple could appear more than once
in a sub-sample and equilibrium matching would not be unique.
15 In effect this means that only interaction effects are important in predicting mar-
riage partners. Therefore the ability to identify δ (subject to a multiplicative constant)
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is sufficient to generate a prediction for optimal pairing. Knowledge about α, β and γ
are not required.
16 The problem of finding p(n, k) is a classic problem in probability. One version of
this problem goes with the following story: A secretary has prepared n different letters
and envelopes addressed to different persons. He puts his letters randomly into the n
envelopes. What is the probability that k letters will go to the intended destination?
This problem was solved more than two centuries ago by the mathematician Montmort,
and the formula for p(n, k) can be found in probability texts such as Feller [1968].
17 Canonical correlation analysis was introduced by Hotelling [1935]. Manly [1986]
contains an elementary exposition of the subject.
18 Both the minimum and the maximum assignment problem can be solved by
Burkard and Derigs’s program with a simple change of signs.
19 Models of individual maximization (e.g., Cochrane [1989]; Varian [1990]) typically
find an efficiency loss of less than five percent. However, since the envelope theorem does
not apply to the optimal assignment problem, the order of magnitude of the efficiency
index in these two types of models are not directly comparable.
20 We also perform a similar exercise for Model NW. The maximum E from one
million random assignments is .537 while the actual E is .806. Again the actual marriage
pattern is more efficient than any of the one million random assignments.
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Table I
Sample Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlation Coefficients
m age m school m china m wage mean
(female)
f age .578 .208 .148 .144 23.108
(3.660)
f school .043 .669 −.008 .520 9.220
(3.908)
f china .152 −.007 .249 −.086 .266
(.442)
f wage −.110 .421 −.121 .552 2.855
(.606)
mean 26.439 9.877 .380 3.161
(male) (4.470) (3.685) (.486) (.626)
The bottom row contains the means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of male characteris-
tics. The last column refer to female characteristics. Main elements in the cross table are simple
correlation coefficients between the corresponding male and female attributes.
Table II
Parameter Estimates for Spouse Selection Model
Variable NW W NW-C W-C
intercept 1.0550 2.8599 0.9748 3.1975
(0.4017) (0.5499) (0.4450) (0.7899)
Male traits
m age −0.1502 −0.1496 −0.1329 −0.1050
(0.0240) (0.0244) (0.0253) (0.0321)
m china −0.0784 −0.0745 −0.0793 −0.0133
0.0301 (0.0304) (0.1819) (0.2445)
m school −0.0595 −0.0527 −0.1107 −0.0261
(0.0158) (0.0162) (0.0272) (0.0413)
m wage −0.4682 −0.9684
(0.1514) (0.2390)
m age2 −0.0027 −0.0026 −0.0027 −0.0027
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
m school2 −0.0076 −0.0066 −0.0079 −0.0065
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
m wage2 −0.1133 −0.1429
(0.0267) (0.0298)
Female traits
f age −0.1064 −0.1185 −0.1215 −0.1841
(0.0244) (0.0250) (0.0257) (0.0322)
f china −0.1234 −0.1157 −0.0579 0.1576
(0.0379) (0.0382) (0.1808) (0.2278)
f school −0.1015 −0.0811 −0.0423 −0.0497
(0.0141) (0.0146) (0.0249) (0.0346)
f wage −0.6888 −0.4884
(0.1451) (0.2261)
f age2 −0.0050 −0.0047 −0.0053 −0.0049
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
f school2 −0.0067 −0.0062 −0.0067 −0.0064
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
f wage2 −0.1094 −0.1055
(0.0276) (0.0288)
Same-trait interactions
m age*f age 0.0128 0.0126 0.0131 0.0127
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0012)
m china*f china 0.2897 0.2829 0.3055 0.2876
(0.0546) (0.0549) (0.0577) (0.0587)
m school*f school 0.0226 0.0199 0.0229 0.0211
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0018)
m wage*f wage 0.4116 0.4789
(0.0456) (0.0570)
continued on next page
Table II (continued)
Variable NW W NW-C W-C
Cross-trait interactions
m age*f china −0.0033 −0.0036
(0.0066) (0.0066)
m age*f school −0.0024 −0.0018
(0.0008) (0.0009)
m age*f wage −0.0088
(0.0063)
m china*f age −0.0033 −0.0045
(0.0080) (0.0084)
m china*f school 0.0078 0.0160
(0.0068) (0.0086)
m china*f wage −0.0373
(0.0552)
m school*f age 0.0024 0.0006
(0.0011) (0.0013)
m school*f china 0.0017 0.0111
(0.0077) (0.0094)
m school*f wage −0.0196
(0.0091)
m wage*f age 0.0227
(0.0085)
m wage*f china −0.0927
(0.0579)
m wage*f school 0.0004
(0.0089)
log-likelihood −4660.51 −4609.22 −4653.92 −4592.02
Standard errors are in parentheses. Models labeled by “W” includes the wage
variable, and models labeled by “NW” does not include the wage variable. The
suffix “C” refer to models that include cross-interaction terms.
Table III
Spouse Selection Model: Restricted Estimates
Variable NW-M NW-F NW-M&F W-M W-F W-M&F
intercept 1.2239 1.0453 1.2774 3.0062 2.6810 2.8265
(0.3697) (0.3767) (0.3120) (0.4982) (0.4974) (0.3923)
Male traits
m age −0.1637 −0.1504 −0.1642 −0.1631 −0.1504 −0.1624
(0.0453) (0.0240) (0.0450) (0.0453) (0.0243) (0.0452)
m china −0.0771 −0.0791 −0.0762 −0.0754 −0.0750 −0.0749
(0.0145) (0.0302) (0.0141) (0.0146) (0.0305) (0.0143)
m school −0.0604 −0.0603 −0.0606 −0.0533 −0.0530 −0.0532
(0.0319) (0.0157) (0.0319) (0.0321) (0.0161) (0.0320)
m wage −0.4553 −0.4683 −0.4383
(0.2615) (0.1513) (0.2604)
m age2 −0.0024 −0.0027 −0.0024 −0.0024 −0.0026 −0.0024
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
m school2 −0.0075 −0.0076 −0.0075 −0.0066 −0.0066 −0.0066
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
m wage2 −0.1137 −0.1128 −0.1159
(0.0255) (0.0267) (0.0252)
Female traits
f age −0.1030 −0.1062 −0.1071 −0.1151 −0.1097 −0.1105
(0.0242) (0.0352) (0.0348) (0.0249) (0.0354) (0.0351)
f china −0.1226 −0.1082 −0.1090 −0.1145 −0.1060 −0.1071
(0.0376) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0378) (0.0204) (0.0204)
f school −0.1017 −0.0998 −0.1005 −0.0810 −0.0798 −0.0801
(0.0139) (0.0295) (0.0295) (0.0145) (0.0298) (0.0631)
f wage −0.6919 −0.6548 −0.6568
(0.1449) (0.2680) (0.2679)
f age2 −0.0050 −0.0050 −0.0049 −0.0047 −0.0048 −0.0048
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
f school2 −0.0067 −0.0067 −0.0066 −0.0062 −0.0063 −0.0063
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
f wage2 −0.1092 −0.1122 −0.1119
(0.0276) (0.0275) (0.0274)
Same-trait interactions
m age*f age 0.0126 0.0127 0.0126 0.0125 0.0126 0.0125
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
m china*f china 0.2904 0.2850 0.2871 0.2840 0.2792 0.2821
(0.0545) (0.0533) (0.0532) (0.0549) (0.0538) (0.0537)
m school*f school 0.0226 0.0226 0.0226 0.0199 0.0199 0.0198
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)
m wage*f wage 0.4113 0.4099 0.4100
(0.0456) (0.0455) (0.0455)
log-likelihood −4661.2 −4660.7 −4661.4 −4610.0 −4609.6 −4610.3
χ2-statistic (d.f.) 1.33 (3) 0.37 (4) 1.79 (6) 1.59 (4) 0.75 (4) 2.15 (8)
Models marked with “F” indicate that marginal productivity restrictions are applied to females.
Models marked with “M” impose such restrictions to males. Models marked with “F&M”
impose the restrictions to both sexes. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Table IV
Spouse Selection Model: Bootstrap Estimates
Variable NW NW-FE NW-M&F W W-FE W-M&F
intercept 3.1329 3.3351 5.4508 5.4078
(1.1342) (1.1573) (1.3396) (1.4184)
Male traits
m age −0.2027 −0.2169 −0.2020 −0.2154
(0.0551) (0.0581) (0.0568) (0.0594)
m china −0.0913 −0.0871 −0.0887 −0.0855
(0.0513) (0.0426) (0.0524) (0.0431)
m school −0.0734 −0.0735 −0.0650 −0.0645
(0.0249) (0.0237) (0.0267) (0.0259)
m wage −0.5943 −0.5708
(0.2170) (0.2358)
m age2 −0.0036 −0.0032 −0.0036 −0.0032
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
m school2 −0.0096 −0.0093 −0.0085 −0.0083
(0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035)
m wage2 −0.1580 −0.1532
(0.0789) (0.0768)
Female traits
f age −0.1534 −0.1510 −0.1736 −0.1625
(0.0617) (0.0629) (0.0690) (0.0700)
f china −0.1492 −0.1245 −0.1401 −0.1221
(0.0867) (0.0608) (0.0089) (0.0616)
f school −0.1248 −0.1222 −0.0999 −0.0982
(0.0241) (0.0226) (0.0245) (0.0236)
f wage −0.8547 −0.8210
(0.2654) (0.2666)
f age2 −0.0066 −0.0063 −0.0062 −0.0060
(0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0030)
f school2 −0.0085 −0.0083 −0.0081 −0.0079
(0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0030)
f wage2 −0.1579 −0.1546
(0.0909) (0.0905)
Same-trait interactions
m age*f age 0.0173 0.0192 0.0168 0.0172 0.0193 0.0167
(0.0054) (0.0060) (0.0052) (0.0054) (0.0061) (0.0052)
m china*f china 0.3409 0.3691 0.3281 0.3336 0.3653 0.3218
(0.1718) (0.1831) (0.1603) (0.1733) (0.1862) (0.1624)
m school*f school 0.0285 0.0304 0.0278 0.0253 0.0277 0.0247
(0.0068) (0.0073) (0.0067) (0.0069) (0.0074) (0.0067)
m wage*f wage 0.5527 0.6509 0.5391
(0.1994) (0.2296) (0.1945)
mean log-likelihood −420.56 −418.72 −421.29 −413.71 −410.86 −414.55
Columns marked with “FE” refer to the fixed effect models. Estimates of the individual fixed
effects are not shown in this table. Columns marked with “M&F” indicate that marginal
productivity restrictions are applied. Bootstrap standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Table V
Theoretical and Empirical Distribution of Correct Matches
k (n = 100) random matching NW NW-FE W W-FE
k ≥ 1 0.6321 0.996 0.996 1.000 0.999
k ≥ 2 0.2642 0.972 0.969 0.992 0.995
k ≥ 3 0.0803 0.908 0.891 0.970 0.970
k ≥ 4 0.0190 0.791 0.774 0.909 0.912
k ≥ 5 0.0037 0.605 0.618 0.809 0.810
k ≥ 6 0.0006 0.432 0.444 0.673 0.672
k ≥ 7 0.0001 0.294 0.273 0.529 0.526
k ≥ 8 1.0e-05 0.177 0.163 0.374 0.374
k ≥ 9 1.1e-06 0.091 0.097 0.212 0.231
k ≥ 10 1.1e-07 0.043 0.048 0.117 0.127
k ≥ 11 1.0e-08 0.017 0.024 0.071 0.073
k ≥ 12 8.3e-10 0.009 0.007 0.030 0.039
k ≥ 13 6.4e-11 0.003 0.003 0.008 0.014
k ≥ 14 4.5e-12 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.003
k ≥ 15 3.0e-13 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
mean 1 5.338 5.307 6.699 6.746
The theoretical distribution is calculated by using the formula in Feller
(1968). The empirical distribution is obtained by solving the optimal as-
signment problem for the predicted index variables from each of the 1000
sub-samples.
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Figure 1
 Frequency Distributions of Correct Predictions: Model W
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Abstract. This paper takes Becker’s efficient marriage market hypothesis at face value,
and directly confront it with data from Hong Kong. The theory of optimal assignment is
used to develop an empirical model of spouse selection, which resembles a Tobit model.
This model can address positive or negative assortative matching as well as marginal
product pricing in marriage markets. We also use a computer algorithm to solve the
assignment problem for imputed marital output. The degree to which the actual pairing
of husbands and wives corresponds to the optimal pairing provides a goodness-of-fit test
of the efficient marriage market hypothesis.
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